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Towards a Quality-Centered Economic Analysis:
Some Simple Diagrams
JOSEF FALKJNGER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The acknowledgement of the fact that commodities typically are not homo-
geneous but of different quality has stimulated economic theory extraordi-
narily. Market signaling and market screening when information about quality
is asymmetric have become important subjects in modem microeconomic
analysis (see e.g. KREPS [1990]). Quality selection, consumer information
about quality or quality competition are central themes in the theory of in-
dustrial organization (see TiROLE [1988]). Also modem macroeconomics has
profited substantially from dealing with quality. For instance, the dependence
of quality on price serves as a microfoundation of rationing equilibria (cf. the
survey of STIGLITZ [1987]), and unobservable product quality provides an
explanation of price rigidity [ALLEN, 1988].
The purpose of the present paper is to put forward an economic analysis in
which quality plays the key role that in usual economic analysis is played by
the price. Conventional economic analysis takes quality as given and investi-
gates how supply and demand are coordinated by the price. Also the literature
mentioned in the above paragraph, though dealing explicitly with the problem
of quality, concentrates on market coordination through prices. Supply and
demand depend on both price and quality, but quality is seen as a function of
the price and thus, ultimately, the (possibly deficient) coordination of supply
and demand goes via the price (which now plays a double role as an indicator
of scarcity as well as of quality at the same time). In contrast to this, the present
analysis tums the conventional procedure on its head. It takes prices as given
and considers market coordination by quality adjustments.
•Professor at the Institute of Public Economics, University of Graz, Austria. I wish to thank J.
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To say that supply and demand are brought into balance by adjusting quality,
instead of price, to its equilibrium value is of course exaggerated. However,
undoubtedly the quality level in a market often changes with the market
situation. On the one side, it is perfectly plausible that in a situation of excess
demand quality deteriorates. One may think of diminishing service time per
client and less careful production under pressure of time or of the use of lower
quality inputs when pressure of demand is high. On the other side, with a
shortage of demand producers want to attract more consumers by offering a
higher quality level (and not only by lowering the price). Actually, disequi-
librium situations in markets for products with varying quality level will induce
both quality and price adjustments, and the market equilibria will be charac-
terized simultaneously by equilibrium quality and equilibrium price. Thus, if
this paper concentrates entirely on market coordination by quality, this is not
meant so much as a perfect description of the real world but rather as a thought
experiment which makes the point that quality matters (and not only, or
sometimes not so much, the price) as clear as possible.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II a simple market model with
coordination of supply and demand by quality is outlined. Section III considers
policy impacts on the equilibrium level of quality in a single market. Especially,
the effects of quality standards and consumer information on the equilibrium
level of quality and quantity in the respective market are analyzed. Section IV
applies the analysis to the standard model of the macroeconomic goods market
Section V contains a summary.
II. MARKET COORDINATION BY QUAUTY
A good, characterized by a quality index q, is offered at price/?. Let.vj = D{p,q)
and Xs = S{p,q) be the corresponding demand and supply curve, where AW, XS
denote the demanded and supplied quantity, respectively. With respect to the
partial derivatives, denoted by subscripts, the usual assumptions are made^
Assumption l:Dp<0 ,Dg>0 ,Sp>0 ,Sq<0 .
The usual market diagram focuses on the price mechanism. Accordingly, it
is drawn in the price-quantity space with/? and jt on the axes. Quality enters the
1. D<, > 0 is a standard assumption (cf. TiROLE [1988, p. 100]). It should be noticed, however,
that the assumption is not necessarily fulfilled for any meaningful notion of quality (see e.g. NELSON
[1991]). 5^ < 0 follows if price is equal to marginal cost and marginal cost increases with quality.
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picture as an exogenous parameter which shifts equilibrium price and quantity.
To put quality (instead of the price) in the center of investigation means that
the market analysis has to be carried out in the {q, .ï)-space. Measuring quality
along the ordinate we have, according to Assumption 1, a positively declined
demand curve and a negatively declined supply curve, respectively. They are
represented in Figure 1. The market equilibrium, E, is now characterized by a
certain equilibrium level of quality, "q.
Figure 1
S ( p . q )
The question is, what happens if quality is out of its equilibrium value?
Suppose ^0 > ^. Then demand is in excess of supply (in Figure 1 the line AB
represents the corresponding level of excess demand). As argued in the intro-
duction, pressure of demand has a negative effect on the quality level of the
goods supplied for various reason. The resulting pressure on input requirements
leads to the use of less qualified inputs or the pressure on time makes production
and service less careful. Thus, if ço > ^ then the quality level is adjusted towards
its equilibrium value 'q and excess demand is reduced. Consider now qo < q.
In this case demand falls short of supply and producers will raise the quality
level of their supply in order to attract more consumers. Again, the quality level
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is adjusted towards the equilibrium value q. These considerations show that the
diagramm presented in Figure 1 represents a meaningful tool for the analysis
of market coordination by quality.
The price of the relevant good enters the picture as an exogenous parameter.
Suppose for example that/? rises iop\ Then, according to Assumption 1, the
supply curve is shifted to the right and the demand curve is shifted to the left,
respectively. The situation is represented in Figure 2.
Figure 2
q /
, D ( p ' , q )
D ( p , q )
S ( p , q )
As a result, the market equilibrium is moved from point E to E' which
corresponds to a comparatively higher level of equilibrium quality, 'q\ The
impact on the equilibrium level of quantity cannot be determined without more
specific assumptions.
The further analysis will show that the simple diagrams presented in this
section are an efficient and elegant tool for discussing interesting economic
problems in the sphere of industrial organization and of macroeconomics.
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m. POLICY IMPACTS ON THE EQUILIBRIUM LEVEL OF QUAUTY
The purpose of this section is to analyze the effects on product quality of some
common policy measures like quality standards and consumer information.
1. Quality Standards
Suppose that a restriction q>qo for some standard ^o>^ is introduced in a
market with equilibrium quality .^ The result is, according to Figure 1, an
excess demand. Since quality must not be lowered, prices may rise until,
according to Figure 2, a new equilibrium at ^' > qo is reached. In sum,
introducing a binding quality standard leads to higher product quality and to
excess demand or an increase of price.
2. Uncertain Quality and Consumer Information
A less trivial task is the clarification of the impact on quality of consumer
information.
Consumers are often imperfectly informed about product quality. That
means, demand cannot be based on a certain value of quality. Rather the
consumer is confronted with a more or less uncertain level of quality. Let q be
the actual quality level of the supplied good. For an imperfectly informed
consumer the judgement of quality is disturbed by a random term E SO that to
him quality is a random variable
5 = ^  + e. (1)
Now, imperfect information about quality can mean two things. The con-
sumer can have wrong expectations or he is (more or less) uncertain that he gets
the expected quality. The following definitions make this distinction precise:
i) Consumers have wrong expectation of quality, if E{z)^^ and thus
ii) Given q = q + t,q" = q + z' with E(t) = E (e'). Consumers have a higher
quality risk if e' > /?se and thus 5' > Rsq. where > RS denote the Rothschild
and Stiglitz ordering of risks.
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Since quality is now a random variable for the consumer, the concept of the
demand curve as a function of quality and price must be reconsidered. The
natural modification oí Dq>0 (Assumption 1), is to assume that, given the
quality risk, demand increases with expected quality.
Assumption 2: Suppose, q' = Rsq. Then, D {p, q') >D (p,q) if E {q') >E(q).
The dependence of demand on the risk of q is less evident. A plausible
assumption is that consumers react to quality risk with caution . Accordingly,
we formulate
Assumption 3: Suppose, E (q') = e (q). Then, D {p,q') < D (p,q) \íq' > Rsq.
Policy measures providing consumers with information about product qu-
ality can thus have the following impacts.
Figure 3
, D ( p , q + £ ° )
D(p ,q+£)
2. Admittedly, we do not have a decision-theoretic argument, which generally excludes that
consumers buy comparatively more if quality is risky. In that case, which however seems less
plausible intuitively, the sign of the risk effects analyzed in this section would be reversed.
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First, they may correct a wrong expectation of quality. Formally, they correct
e with E {e)^0 to EO with Zo = RSE and E (Zo) = 0. According to Assumption 2,
that means, the demand curve is shifted to the left (to the right) if £ (e) > 0 (if
E (e) < 0, respectively). Figure 3 illustrates the situation for the case E (e) > 0,
that is, if consumers overestimate the quality level before they become informed
about the true quality that can be expected.
Consumer information shifts the market equilibrium from point EoioEi.So
it increases quality and decreases quantity in the relevant market. Obviously,
if consumers underestimate quality before they become informed, then the
effects are reversed.
Secondly, policy measures providing information about product quality to
consumers may change the uncertainty about actual product quality, given its
expected level. Let e, e' with E{e) = E (e') represent the relevant quality risks
before the provision of information about product quality to the consumer and
after the provision of information, respectively.
Figure 4
q A
D ( p , q + e )
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Usually, information will reduce uncertainty about quality. That means,
e' < RSE. According to Assumption 3, the demand curve is shifted to the right
in this case. See Figure 4. As a result, quality decreases and quantity increases
in the relevant market. At first glance, the conclusion that consumer information
about product quality decreases the equilibrium level of quality in the respective
market is somewhat surprising. The reason behind this result is that with less
uncertainty about quality a lower level of quality suffices to induce a certain
level of demand.
However, providing the consumer with information about product quality
may also increase his uncertainty. Note that it is the consumer's subjective view
which is relevant for demand behavior. If a consumer becomes better informed,
then he sees the true risk more clearly. It may be higher than the consumer's
view of the risk before information. One could also say, consumers become
more critical in the sense that they are increasingly aware of the variability of
quality in the market. In this case, e' >y?s£. According to Assumption 3, the
demand curve is shifted to the left. As a result, quality increases and quantity
decreases in the considered market.
Summing up, one can say that measures which provide consumers with
information about product quality have a quality-increasing and quantity-
decreasing effect if consumers overestimate quality or underestimate the vari-
ability of product quality in a market; that is, if information makes consumers
more critical. Information which corrects an underestimation of quality by
consumers or which reduces the consumer's quality risk in a market leads to
an equilibrium with a comparatively lower level of quality and higher level of
quantity. To get from these general conclusions to a definite statement or
testable hypothesis concerning the effect of a concrete policy measure, one has
to find out, how the measure affects the mind of the consumers. This is of course
a speculative task. In the following, I will present a list of hypotheses which are
suggested by the above analysis. (At this point, it is necessary to recall the
restrictions of the analysis. It concentrates on partial equilibria in a competitive
market with fixed price and variable quality).
The first two hypotheses concern measures which affect the consumers'
expectation value of the product quality in a market. They are related to the
analysis in Figure 3.
Hypothesis I : Information exposing that fake is not unusual in some branch
(the one or the other Weinskandal may serve as an example) leads to a
downward revision of the consumers' expectation of quality. Thus, according
to the above analysis, a scandal induces an increase of product quality and a
reduction of quantity in the respective market.
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Hypothesis 2: Cooperative campaignes to raise the image of a branch, if successful,
lead to an upward revision of the consumers' expectation of quality. According to
the above analysis, the induced shift of market equilibrium is characterized by
a comparatively lower level of quality and a higher level of quantity.
The next two hypotheses deal with measures which affect the consumers'
uncertainty about product quality. They are related to the analysis in Figure 4.
Hypothesis 3: General consumer education tells consumers to be aware of
the variability of quality supplied. Thus it increases the consumers' uncertainty
and, according to the above analysis, leads to an increase of quality and decrease
of quantity in all markets with imperfect quality information.
Hypothesis 4: Specific Consumer Reports or Warentests reduce the quality
risk for the consumer. Thus, the diffusion of such tests and reports, leads to a
shift of the market equilibrium towards more quantity and a comparatively
lower quality level.
The last two hypotheses describe possible dynamics suggested by the above
analysis. The idea is that true product quality is detected with time.
Hypothesis 5: Consumers' expectation of quality is revised downwards/up-
wards if the quality of the product is overestimated/underestimated, respec-
tively. Thus, according to the analysis in Figure 3, the quality level will rise
and quantity decline in a market with initially overestimated products, and vice
versa if the quality of a newly introduced product is underestimated at the
beginning.
Hypothesis 6: Experience and learning reduces the quality risk. Thus, the
above analysis (Figure 4) predicts that, other things being equal, the market
size increases and the quality level declines with time.
IV. THE MACROECONOMIC GOODS MARKET
The relevant price in conventional macroeconomic goods-market analysis is
the interest rate, i. It coordinates the consumption-savings behavior with
investment decisions. Pursuing the idea that consumer decisions are not only
governed by prices but also by quality, one comes to the conclusion that besides
the interest rate the development of product quality is an important factor for
the consumption-saving decision and thus for the macroeconomic goods market
equilibrium. Recently, different authors have put forward models of long-run
growth based on endogenous product innovations which upgrade quality over
time (see SEGERSTROM, AN ANT and DINOPOULIS [1990], GROSSMAN and
HELPMAN [1991] and the references there). The following considerations
concentrate on short-run problems and take the development of quality as given.
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Let qo, q\ be the (index oí) present and future quality of consumption goods,
respectively.
1. The Consumption and Saving Decision
Consumers have common preferences. Utility in period / is a function, u{cuqt),
of income spent on consumption, a, and of the quality of the consumption
goods, qt. Assumption 4 summarizes standard assumptions concerning margi-
nal utility.
Assumption4: Uc >O,Uq> 0, Ucc<O,Ucq> 0.
For deciding how much of his present income, y, he spends and how much
he saves, the consumer maximizes the sum of present and (discounted by some
factor Ô) future utility, subject to the budget constraint
U=u (Co, qo) + ÔW (ci, ^ l ) , (2)
ci = (1 + i)(y - Co). (3)
(The price level is held constant.)
To avoid aggregation problems, homothetic preferences are usually as-
sumed. Thus, suppose that u is homogenous in c. Then, maximization of (2)
(under restriction (3)) with respect to co is equivalent to maximization of
U=u {z,qo) + ÔM ((1 + /)(1 -z).qi) (4)
with respect to z = Co/y .
The fu-st-order-condition for z is:
F = du {z,q o)/dc - 0 ( 1 + 03« ((1 + 0(1 - z), q\)/dc = 0 (5)
For a given interest rate, it defines the propensity to consume as a function,
z (qo, qi), of present and future product quality. Because of the homogeneity
assumption, the propensity to consume does not vary with the consumer's
income. Differentiating F implicitly, we get, under Assumption 4,
dz/dqo > 0 and dz/dqi < 0 .
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Since the propensity to consume, defined by condition (5), is independent
of the consumer's income (due to the homogeneity assumption), aggregate
consumption, C, is given by the equation
= z{qo,qi)Y.
{Y denotes aggregate income).
(7)
2. The IS-Curve in the Quality-Income Space
It is problematical to argue that also investment behavior is govemed by the
development of product quality. Only questionable assumptions conceming the
dependence of investment on quality could be made. Therefore, the more
adequate procedure is to see investment independent of quality. Let / be the
exogenously given level of investment. Then, in view of (7), the goods market
equilibrium is characterized by the condition
Y = I/[l - z {qo, q\)]
Figure 5
(8)
a) b)
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Using (6), one can draw the corresponding IS-curve in the quality-income
space. We find that the IS-curve is positively sloped in the (7, ^o)-space and
negatively sloped in the (K, q\)-spnct. The precise shape of the curves is of
course not determined. Figure 5 a and b present stylized versions of these
IS-curves (where 2(0,<7i) = z{qo,°°) = 0 and z{qo,0) = z(oo,qi) = 1 is assumed).
3. Product Quality and the Problem of Effective Demand
The IS-curve describes the possible goods market equilibria. A problem of
effective demand arises if the realized equilibrium income falls short of the full
employment level. The point of this paper is to concentrate on quality adjust-
ments (instead of the usually considered mechanism of price adjustments) in
the analysis of markets. The relevant price in the macroeconomic goods market
is the interest rate, and a problem of effective demand arises if the interest rate
does not fall to the level corresponding to full employment. Now, the present
Figure 6
IS -Curve
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analysis takes the interest rate as given and concentrates on the role of present
and future product quality. Accordingly, a problem of effective demand arises
if, for whatever reasons, quality does not adjust to the level corresponding to
full capacity. This is illustrated in Figure 6.
Let Yf be capacity output Then, the level of present quality (given future
quality), which guarantees that full employment is realized, is qf. If actual
product quality is restricted by some upper limit q<qf, then only the underem-
ployment equilibrium income Y will be realized. Possible reasons for the
existence of an upper limit of quality are technical bottlenecks (for instance
lack of high-quality inputs or of high precision machinery), education and
training problems but also institutional arrangements like patent restrictions.
(Of course, one could draw an analogous diagram with respect to future quality.
It is easy to see that an underemployment equilibrium results if future quality
is restricted by some lower bound. That means, if the consumer's expectations
concerning future quality are so high that they save too much).
As far as economic policy is concerned. Figure 6 shows that in principle
three types of policy measures exist by which an underemployment equilibrium
can be overcome. First, quality-independent expansion of demand shifts the
relevant IS-curve to the right so that the full-employment equilibrium D is
realized. Secondly, labor-supply management reduces capacity output to Y so
that rbecomes a full-employment equilibrium. Or, finally, measures promoting
and diffusing high quality production shifts the quality restriction upwards until
the equilibrium point Q is reached. Of course, these are very partial considera-
tions, since interest rate, wage rate and price level matter in the real world.
However, to undertake a thought experiment which emphasizes the usually
neglected role of product quality is the purpose of this analysis.
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SUMMARY
This paper puts the role of product quality in the market game of supply and demand into the center
of the analysis. To that purpose it provides a systematic investigation of market diagrams with
quality instead of price on the ordinate. This new focus allows interesting conclusions by simple
application of well-known diagrammatic methods. For instance, as far as single markets are
concemed, it is shown that providing consumers with information about product quality may
increase or decrease quality in the market, depending on the type of information provided. Another
conclusion of practical relevance, conceming the macroeconomic activity level, is that an effective
demand problem may be caused if present product quality is too low compared with the product
quality expected for the future.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Die vorliegende Arbeit versucht, die Rolle der Produktqualität fürdas Zusammenspiel von Angebot
und Nachfrage ins Zentrum der ökonomischen Analyse zu rücken. Dazu werden Marktdiagramme
mit einem Qualitätsindex anstelle des Preises konstruiert und untersucht. Analog zu den übUchen
komparativ-statischen Analysen mit Marktdiagramm wird die Rolle der ProduktquaLtät in ver-
schiedenen mikro- und makroökonomischen Fragestellungen untersucht Insbesondere wird ge-
zeigt, wie Konsumenteninfomiation jenach Art der Information zu einer Steigerung oder Senkung
der Qualität im betreffenden Markt führen kann. Eine andere, makroökonomisch relevante Schluss-
folgerung ist zum Beispiel, dass es zu einem Problem der effektiven Nachfrage kommt, wenn das
gegenwärtige Qualitätsniveau der Produkte im Vergleich zu dem für die 2^kunft erwarteten zu
niedrig ist.
RÉSUMÉ
Cet article analyse la rôle, que joue la qualité d'un produit pour l'équilibre de l'offre et de la
demande sur le marché. Pour cela des diagrammes du marché sont construes que montrent à l'axe
des coordonnées un indice de qualité au Leu du prix. Avec ces diagrammes des analyses compara-
tif-statiques sont effectuées pour examiner la rôle de la qualité dans divers problèmes micro- et
macroéconomiques. En particulier il est exploré, comme l'information des consommateurs peut
induire une augmentation ou une réduction de qualité sur le marché selon les circonstances. Une
autre conclusion est par example, qu'un problème de demande effective résulte, si le niveau actuel
de qualité est trop bas en comparaison au niveau futur.
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